Inquisitive to a Fault

Recently The New York Times reported that up to one third of the oil supplies from a specific Iraqi refinery are being stolen and sold on the black market. The reporters continued to state that most if not all of these stolen monies are going to insurgents and, thus, being used to kill Iraqis and Americans. One wonders why, after five years of this conflict, we are in this position? Why are we not able to control this kind of corruption? Why is not the Iraqi Army able to “stand up” and defend its own oil resources? Perhaps it is the case that those who are doing the stealing, engaging in this corruption are people who want to heat their own homes, who want a steady stream of electricity into their homes. All reasonable desires. Perhaps it is also the case that those who are engaged in fueling the insurgency in this way are participating in the on-going feud between Shia, Sunni and Kurds. It may also be the case that our “winning” with the Surge is not going far enough to quell this kind of internal strife amongst the various parties. I wonder when we will realize that the force of armament alone, as General David Petraeus has often asserted, will not be sufficient to bring stability to Iraq. When will we realize that it is up to the politicians to bring stability? Perhaps it is a lot easier to wage military combat than slowly develop and foster the institutions required for democracy.

As Space Shuttle Columbia circled the earth in late January, 2003 it carried the hopes of NASA and the country for technological success and continued space exploration superiority.  Unfortunately, the oldest of the space shuttle fleet had suffered a fatal blow that led to disaster.  This  tragedy reflects major organizational and personal inadequacies that need to be addressed lest we lose the essence of living within a democracy.

            As Columbia sped across the planet at 15 times the speed of sound, we learned that a large piece of foam had flaked off the external fuel tank and slammed into the leading edge of the left wing. Foam had fallen off the external tank before, but, as seen on subsequent video tapes of the launch, this was a particularly large suitcase-sized piece.  Many were concerned about this anomaly. One engineer raised questions and sent emails to his superiors trying to determine the possible negative effects of this unusual event.  Others advocated taking pictures from high flying aircraft.

The contractor, Boeing, provided a PowerPoint presentation that minimized any negative consequences.

            The engineer’s emails basically went unanswered.  His curiosity was not satisfied and few diagnostic measures were taken.

            During final briefings in Houston with the manager in charge, Linda Ham, the engineer with doubts and questions perplexing him sat there with one last chance to raise important questions about safety and re-entry through the atmosphere.  When it came time to voice any reasons why Columbia should not return on schedule to Kennedy Space Center, he sat there silently.

            “I just couldn’t do it,” he said later. “I just couldn’t ask the question.”

            Shortly thereafter, Columbia began to burn up over Texas only fifteen minutes from touch down and disintegrated on 1 February, 2003.  Debris and body parts were strewn from Arizona to Texas.

            These losses were outrageous, tragic and deeply disturbing.

Based upon post accident reports, those of astronauts and other investigators, this accident, like the 1986 loss of shuttle Challenger, was completely preventable. 

Unfortunately and sadly NASA failed to probe to the deep, root causes of irregularities that had happened before:  in the case of foam falling from external fuel tanks—64 times; and in the matter of flames shooting out beyond O-Rings prior to the explosion of Challenger in 1986,  fifteen times.   Managers called this “normalization of deviance.”      

            Dr. Sally Ride, America’s first woman astronaut, along with several others, analyzed the tragedy and came to this stunning conclusion:

                        “One of the responsibilities of a NASA manager is to be inquisitive to a fault. You must ask and ask and ask.”

            Evidently, Dr. Ride felt the NASA managers had not met this high standard.

            Questions: In which areas of our lives do we need to be “inquisitive to a fault”?  why?

For several years before their stock fell from a high of over $90 to below $.50 Enron’s public image was of a creaky aluminum man walking around in various cities of the world dramatizing the need to ask “Why?” Challenging underlying assumptions was their modus operandi. “Everybody knows you can’t do anything about the weather,” intoned one ad for their innovative ways of helping companies hedge against drought, rain and other profit-reducing cloud covers. Enron figured out a way to solve this problem.

But in the days since their crash and filing for bankruptcy, many in the public and Congress have been attempting to put the pieces together, to find out what happened.

The New York Times editorialized recently, that after disclosing the “troubling deals. . .few analysts bothered to raise questions at a time when the company’s revenues, profits and stock price were soaring.” Other observers felt that the public media tended to be “credulous. .[the] media became a participant in the story.” (Madrick, 2002) They didn’t ask the kinds of questions that Bethany Maclean of Fortune magazine asked, the simple question, “How exactly does Enron make its money?” (2001) Enron seemed like a “big black box,” and quite impenetrable to ordinary human intelligence.

Enron seems to have represented the kind of culture where inquisitiveness about profits and murky JEDI/Raptor partnerships was definitely not welcome by executives and CEOs. In meetings with stock brokers Enron executives scoffed at their inquiries. “People who raise questions are people who have not gone through [our business] in detail and who want to throw rocks at us,” said Jeffrey Skilling [Enron CEO at the time]. Indeed, Enron dismissed criticism “as ignorance or as sour grapes. . .” (McLean, 2001) One analyst noted, “You couldn’t ask hard questions, because it was viewed as offensive.” (Smith, 2002, p. C17, emphasis added).

One auditor from Arthur Andersen who, in 1999, did ask pesky, troublesome questions about Enron’s JEDI partnerships was Carl Bass. Enron complained and Bass responded. “I am not into negotiating with the client over accounting” principles, he e-mailed a colleague. Subsequently, he was removed from the Enron account. (Hamburger, Schmitt and Wilke, 2002, p. C1)

Unlike so many other companies Enron had a publicized philosophy of asking good questions, challenging assumptions, going where others had not thought of nor dared to, but that culture eventually yielded to the arrogance of power and privilege. (Excerpt from Chapter One of A Rude Revolution)

Questions:
Where else do we find organizations that are affronted by those who ask too many questions?
Why we sometimes shrink from asking hard questions of people in organizations like Enron?
What does the Enron case tell us about American business practices? About other elements of our culture?
How do we work to change the cultures of such organizations, if possible?

References:
Tom Hamburger, Richard Schmitt and John Wilke (2002) “Auditor Who Questioned Accounting for Enron Speaks to Investigators.” The Wall Street Journal, 1 April, p. C1

Bethany McLean (2001) “Is Enron Overpriced?” Fortune. 5 March. (www.fortune.com)

Jeff Madrick (2002) Appearance on “The News Hour with Jim Lehrer.” 19 February.

Rebecca Smith (2002) “The Analyst Who Warned About Enron.” The Wall Street Journal, 29 January, pp. C1, 17.